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Powers: Cross Fire on the Close Corporation: Norms Versus Needs

CROSS FIRE ON THE CLOSE CORPORATION:
NORMS VERSUS NEEDS
LEONARD S. PowERs*

Suppose that Gator and Growl wish to start a business or to continue one which they have successfully developed as partners. Gator
has the technical skill, and Growl has the capital and general business
experience. Gator expects to give his full time and technical talent
to the undertaking; Growl is to contribute the greater portion of
the capital required and his general business ability. Growl is not
solely dependent on income from this business for his livelihood, but
Gator is. They wish to have an arrangement whereby no major
policy decision is to be taken without unanimous agreement. Neither
desires to put it in the power of the other to control unilaterally
salaries, dividends, or tenure as an officer or employee. Gator is not
willing to be placed in a position of being "frozen out" by Growl.'
Growl must protect his larger capital contribution. This business
situation is such a common type that further description is superfluous. All will recognize it.
Such a business arrangement would be simple to work out in a
partnership agreement, and there would be no question about its
validity. Gator would not be subject to complete control by Growl,
even though Growl's financial contribution is much larger. But there
are two defects in this solution: (1) Gator and Growl both desire the
limited liability for their undertaking which the corporate form alone
*A.B. 1940, Duke University; J.D. 1950, University of North Carolina; LL.M.
1956, Duke University; Professor of Law, University of Florida.
'This can be done by a majority stockholder through his control of the board
of directors. By having himself and members of his family elected or appointed to
high-salaried positions, by curtailing dividends, by discharging a minority stockholder-employee, and by other tactics which oppress the undesired minority, the
latter's lot can be made extremely unpleasant and, consequently, untenable. If one
could safely assume that the participants in such a close corporation would
always act in harmony, there would be no problem. Numerous lawsuits evidence
how unsafe that assumption is.
"A stockholder, in taking stock in the ordinary corporation, submits, within
the charter limits, to a guidance of the corporate affairs according to the will
of the owners of a majority of the stock and through the directors whom the
majority choose." Stone v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 56 F.2d 553, 554 (5th
Cir. 1932).
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provides; and (2) tax considerations may make the corporate form
more desirable, particularly for Growl, who has other income. 2 The
only type of business organization which offers any hope of achieving
all these goals is the corporation. Not even the limited partnership
will do it because there must be at least one general partner in a
limited partnership, 3 and this general partner is subject to personal
liability.4 Also, the limited partner must refrain from taking part
in the control of the business if he is to retain limited liability, 5 and
both Gator and Growl desire to exercise managerial control. No
existing form of partnership will accomplish the objective. Is it
possible to utilize the corporate form for such a business venture?
Gator and Growl and their attorneys will find in most states a
business corporation act which was enacted in contemplation of the
corporation whose shares are widely held and which will automatically cast them into a mold wherein the minority shareholder may
find himself at the mercy of the majority shareholder, who can, as a
practical matter, dominate meetings of both shareholders and directors. The Florida Business Corporation Act, 6 like its counterparts in
many other states, prescribes a representative form of government
with majority rule. The affairs of the corporation are placed in the
hands of a board of directors periodically elected by majority vote
according to the number of shares held. The board of directors, acting
2While there are several tax-saving possibilities provided by the corporate form
of business organization, probably the best example is the opportunity afforded to
the stockholder-officers of a close corporation to pay themselves salaries (deductible
from corporate income) instead of dividends, building up the value of their interests by retention of earnings within the corporation, and then realizing this
enhanced value by a distribution that is taxed at capital gain rates rather than at
personal rates. The tax gatherer, of course, has devised some obstacles to such a
plan. See Freeland and Stephens, The Commissioner and the Corporation, 11 U.
FLA. L. REV. 509 (1958).
There have been suggestions that close corporations be taxed as are partnerships, thereby removing tax considerations from the partnership versus corporation dilemma. Lowndes, Taxing the Income of the Close Corporation, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 558, 581 (1953); O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close
Corporations,23 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 341, 361-62 (1958). Congress has recently
made such treatment elective. This may result in incorporation being more desirable than before for the corporation with no more than ten stockholders. See
Freeland and Stephens, supra at 535.
3FLA.

STAT.

4FLA. STAT.
5

FLA. STAT.

6FLA. STAT.

§620.01

(1957);

§620.09 (1957);
§620.07 (1957);
c. 608 (1957).

UNIFORM

LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP

AcT §1.

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT §9.
UNIFORM LIMITFD PARTNFRSIIIP AcT §7.
UNIFORM
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by a majority of a quorum, may choose the officers of the corporation,
exercise its powers, and manage its ordinary business free from any
interference from minority shareholders or minority directors. Such
an arrangement is about as appropriate for a close corporation such
as Gator and Growl wish to form as the United Nations Charter would
be for a small town. Unless ingenuity is present, Gator will probably
be placed at the mercy of Growl, who will own more shares than
Gator because he contributed more capital.
In the United States the concept of the close corporation has developed with very little statutory basis in an area in which the legislature has provided most of the law. This type of business organization, displaying many of the characteristics of a corporation while at
the same time partaking of the nature of a partnership in some respects, is seeking legal recognition. This is in response to a growing
demand from the business community. Yet the legal status of this
type of business organization is still unclear, and uncertainties surround it in many states, including Florida. The evolution of this
hybrid form of business association is another example of the dynamic
quality of the common law. As the needs of the business world change,
the forms of business organization change also to accomodate the new
needs.
There are several characteristics of a close corporation. The stock
usually will not be listed on any public exchange, nor will it even
be handled in over-the-counter markets; there are usually restrictions on the transfer of the shares; and the stockholders themselves
are usually the directors and officers of the corporation. This dosing
of the corporation to outsiders as far as stock ownership is concerned
and the emphasis upon direct management by the shareholders, as
directors and officers, are features that resemble a partnership rather
than a corporation.7 The really distinctive characteristic of the close
corporation is this identity between the ownership and the management - ownership and management are united in the shareholders.
This basic characteristic is traditionally associated with partnerships
rather than corporations. Since the creators of a close corporation
usually want to keep it dosed, this results in the close corporation
being one wherein all of the issued stock is often owned by a small
group of persons. One-man corporations and family corporations are
close corporations, but there are many close corporations that do
not have this kind of unity. Not all of them are small; the Ford
7Kramer, Foreword, 18 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 433 (1953).
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Motor Company was until recently a conspicuous example of a large
close corporation. These characteristics are, of course, interrelated
and will vary greatly in relative importance when different close
corporations are compared.
Returning to the problem of Gator and Growl, can they protect
themselves by setting up a business organization with many partnership characteristics, and still enjoy the limited liability and tax status
of stockholders in a corporation? With the objectives desired by Gator
and Growl in mind, the first step is to examine the business corporation act of the state in which the corporation is to incorporate, along
with the decisions construing the act. There is much variation among
the states as to the legal status of the "incorporated partnership,"
even where the statutory law is very similar. It will probably not be
overlooked, in this connection, that it is possible to incorporate under
the law of a state that has a business corporation act favorable to
close corporations such as New York or North Carolina and to operate
as a foreign corporation in Florida and other states. The internal
affairs of a corporation are controlled by the law of the state in which
it is incorporated. The legal doubts about the close corporation arise
out of these internal relations among the participants themselves
rather than out of relations between the corporation and those outside the corporation.
It is very strange that the law generally has been more favorable
to the one-man corporation than the close corporation that has more
than one shareholder. Actually, analysis reveals that the legal considerations ought to be similar and that the one-man corporation
is merely one type of close corporation. In the one-man corporation
there is a combination of proprietorship with the corporate form
so as to have the complete control of the former and the limited liability of the latter.8 It, too, is a hybrid. Similarly, the wholly-owned
subsidiary corporation is merely one type of one-man corporation,
achieving limited liability within the limited liability of the parent
SMost states, including Florida, require as incorporators "three or more persons."
(1957). A corporation becomes a one-man type when,
after incorporation, one person acquires all the shares, often according to a preconceived plan. Most courts have approved this practice, disregarding the corporate
personality only when improper or dishonest purposes are present. Advertects, Inc.
v. Sawyer Industries, 84 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1955); see Cataldo, Limited Liability with
FLA. STAT. §608.03 (1) (a)

One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 473
(1953); Trau, Florida's Corporate Code: Draftsmanship and Practice, 12 U. MIAMI

L. REv. 63 (1957).
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corporation, the latter having complete control of the subsidiary corporation, as would a proprietor. Both kinds of one-man corporations incorporate under general business corporation acts and have received
the kiss of judicial approval, though not unanimously.9 One might
expect to find a similar reception when two or three shareholders try
to achieve similar ends through amalgamation of partnership and
corporation. The courts have not, however, received the close corporation with that cordiality.
A need for some clarification of the legal status of the close corporation is apparent. The average attorney probably spends more
time working on the problems of close corporations than on the
problems of corporations with stock widely held. Also, a recent development is the use of the dose corporation in order to carry out
joint ventures too burdensome for one of the participating corporations alone. Usually several corporations combine to carry out some
specific project or bid on some particular contract. Naturally, each
desires partnership control and protection against outsiders. Yet, at
the same time, they all desire limited liability because of the great
risks involved. 0
9Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 241 N.C. 473, 85 S.E.2d 677
(1955), modified on rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1946), 34 N.C.L. Rav.
531; Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the One- or Two-Man Corporation, 34
N.C.L. REv. 471 (1956). The opinion in the case cited stated that a corporation
with less than three stockholders was "dormant" and that the corporate entity
could be disregarded. The North Carolina Legislature has enacted amendments
to the North Carolina Business Corporation Act designed to neutralize this dictum.
N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 550.
10"It would be a mistake, however, to assume that close corporations are limited
in use to small business. In recent years it has become commonplace for two or
more large corporations to join in a common enterprise through the instrumentality
of a close corporation, the stock of which is owned equally or in agreed proportions by each of the sponsoring companies. The mushroom growth, both in
size and numbers, of such close corporations makes it a reasonable prophecy that
the peculiar problems of this form of business organization will receive more
adequate consideration and attention in the future." Scott, Developments in Corporate Laws, 12 Bus. LAw. 438 (1957).
The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 18, 1958, p. 1, col. 6:
"The growing size and complexity of some of the research and development
jobs now being parceled out by Uncle Sam's Defense Department are breeding what
almost amounts to a new form of business enterprise -team contracting.
"It's a method that permits companies with a variety of capabilities to put
their heads together for the sake of submitting a single bid on a big contract.
"This type of corporate cooperation has advantages for both big and small
firms. It permits a small company, with one particular skill, to get in on the
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The growing utilization of the close corporation, however, does
not necessarily mean that its legal status is no longer doubtful or
that the participants have the business arrangements they desire for
their protection. It is not until the corporate honeymoon is over
and the majority stockholder begins to exercise control in an area
in which his and minority interests diverge that the minority participant realizes his mistake and, perhaps, the mistake of his attorney.
It might be helpful to briefly contrast the characteristics of a
partnership with those of a corporation. A partnership is not a juristic entity as is a corporation. Partners as principals own the assets
directly, and each is a principal and an agent to his fellow partners.
Each partner has implied authority to act for all within the scope
of the partnership business; and, in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, each partner has the right to take part in the management of the business. A partnership does not survive the death or
withdrawal of a partner. These characteristics are needed by partners
because of the absence of limited liability. Since each partner is a
direct owner and has full personal liability for acts of his fellow partners within the scope of the partnership, it is necessary that he have
complete confidence in all his partners and that new partners not be
substituted without his consent. He needs to participate in the
management, since he has so much at stake. Also, it is important that
the partnership be dissolved whenever a partner desires to terminate
his risk. It is possible to modify many of these characteristics by a
partnership agreement. Limited liability can be achieved through
the use of the limited partnership, and it is generally conceded that
partners may provide that the death of a partner shall not result in
winding up. Statutes often permit use of a common name. The Uniform Limited Partnership Act has done a great deal to give the partnership certain attributes of a corporate entity. Yet, as has been
pointed out earlier, the limited partnership does not answer the needs
of Gator and Growl. They both want to manage, and neither can
ground floor of a big contract that calls for many skills. And it allows a large

company to participate in many mammoth research efforts, when any one of them
alone could easily soak up all its scientific talents.
"Some of the projects now in the works, such as exploring outer space or
developing supersensitive devices to warn against enemy attack, almost require this
kind of organizational approach. The method seems certain to spread as business
men become more familiar with its benefits- and mechanics."
See also Broden and Scanlan, The Legal Status of Joint Venture Corporations,
11 VAND. L. REv. 673 (1958).
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be a limited partner because one's livelihood and the other's fortune
depend on retaining managerial control over the enterprise. They
desire to have a partnership arrangement in corporate form, with legal
recognition of the entity of a corporation which will assure them of
freedom from personal liability beyond their investments in the
undertaking. There is also the possibility of tax considerations favoring the corporate form, although there is certainly nothing permanent
about the tax advantage one business form may have over another,
due to the frequent changes in the tax laws and the differing and
changing tax postures of the individual participants. 1
Is it possible to wed corporation with partnership so as to produce the attractive features of the corporation blended with the
partnership characteristics the owners wish to retain? The giving
of corporate attributes to the partnership in the limited partnership
statutes has fallen short of the result desired by many. The other
possibility is considered here: basting the corporation turkey with
partnership gravy.
People like Gator and Growl, while desiring limited liability and
perhaps some tax advantages, dislike four consequences of incorporating to get them: (I) centralized management of a board of directors; (2) free transferability of shares; (3) survival of the business unit
despite the death or withdrawal of a participant; and (4) the legal
formalities required by most business corporation acts for the conduct
of the affairs of a corporation. They want to incorporate without
reaping these consequences. The traditional expectation is that stockholders and directors will act by majority vote rigidly conforming to
the formalities prescribed by statute and custom, that shares will be
freely transferable, and that dissolution will be avoided except in
the most extreme situations. Deviations from this pattern by charter,
bylaw, or agreement have raised doubts as to legal validity. There
has been little effort by legislatures or courts to make any distinction
between the publicly held corporation and the close corporation,
though it is obvious that the two types are quite different and need
not be subjected to the same inflexible mold. The deviations from
the orthodox corporate pattern desired by Gator and Growl are
limited to the internal organization of the corporation, and there is
probably no substantial risk of injury to shareholders, creditors, or
the public. The corporate norms they wish to avoid were created
largely for the protection of stockholders in publicly held corporalSee note 2 suPra.
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tions. There has been much attention focused on this subject recently.1 2 It is the purpose of this article to explore the problem, with

particular attention being given to the Business Corporation Act of
Florida and the decisions of Florida courts.
MINORITY CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS

Gator fears control by a majority of a board of directors and fears
a majority vote of stockholders that might change the membership of
the board. This raises a very complicated problem. Assuming that
the majority stock interest is agreeable, is it possible to dispense with
majority rule in the modern business corporation?
An agreement signed by all stockholders to vote at meetings of
stockholders for certain persons as directors is probably valid and
enforceable. 13 Such agreements among all stockholders relating to the
employment of certain of them as officers and employees have sometimes been enforced.14 Similarly, such agreements among all stock120'N-AL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (1958); Cary, How Illinois
Corporations May Enjoy Partnership Advantages, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1953);
Delaney, The Corporate Director: Can His Hands Be Tied in Advance?, 50 COLUm.
L. REv. 52 (1950); Hornstein, judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership,
18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 435 (1953); Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the
Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040 (1950); Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488 (1948); Latty, The Close Corporation and
the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432 (1956);
O'Neal, Protecting Shareholders' Control Agreements Against Attack, 14 Bus. LAW.
184 (1958); O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 341 (1958); O'Neal, Molding the Corporate Form to Particular
Business Situations: Optional Charter Clauses, 10 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1956); O'Neal,
Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions: Use of Special Charter
and By-Law Provisions, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 451 (1953); Robinson, "Shareholders' Agreements" and the Statutory Norm, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 68 (1957); Symposium - The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 345 (1957); The Business Lawyer, Nov. 1954, p. 9.
3
1 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del.
Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947); E. K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157
Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954); Storer v. Ripley, 1 Misc. 2d 235, 125 N.Y.S.2d 831
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 950, 125 N.Y.S.2d 339 (2d Dep't 1953); Baran v.
Baran, 59 Pa. D. & C. 556 (C.P. 1947).
4
1 Thompson v. J. D. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 Ill. 54, 116 N.E. 648 (1917);
Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936); Kronenberg v. Sullivan County
Steam Laundry Co., 91 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Matter of Seymour Grean
& Co., 274 App. Div. 279, 82 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1st Dep't 1948); Baran v. Baran, supra
note 13. Contra, Borland v. Sass Printing Co., 95 Colo. 53, 32 P.2d 827 (1934);
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holders requiring unanimity or near unanimity for any action at
stockholders' meetings have been upheld, 15 though there are decisions
to the contrary.16 The dividing line seems to be controlled by the
extent to which the arrangement among stockholders invades what
the courts regard as the area of business management-the domain
of the director.17 In addition to pooling agreements, irrevocable proxies and voting trusts may also be used to confer some measure of
control on a minority stock interest.
There are two levels to consider in connection with attempts to
confer some control on a minority stock interest: some types of
corporate action depend on votes of stockholders; others depend on
votes of directors. The objective is to establish veto rights at each
level so that minority stockholders may exercise partnership-like
control. While veto power at the stockholder level alone would accomplish the end desired as to control over election of directors and
adoption of fundamental changes, it alone is not enough to protect
the minority stockholder in a Gator-Growl Corporation. The same
can be said for veto power only at the director level. If that is the
only place it is present, it would not help very much if the stockholder concerned could not be assured of election to the board of
directors or could not block a damaging amendment of the certificate
or bylaws. Conversely, it would help very little to be assured of election to the board of directors while at the same time being outvoted
on the board by a simple majority of directors, perhaps even being
removed as an officer-executive by a majority of directors. Growl, the
majority stockholder, could make Gator's position untenable by majority voting control at either level.
What is needed at the stockholder level is assurance that each
stockholder will be elected a director and that each will have the
Lothrop v. Gowdeau, 142 La. 342, 76 So. 794 (1917); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263
N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Creed v. Copps, 103 Vt. 164, 152 AtI. 369 (1930).
By contrast, agreements among less than all of the stockholders relating to the
employment of one or more of them by the corporation have frequently been
held to be unenforceable. Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376 (1917);
Bond v. Graf, 163 Ore. 264, 96 P.2d 1091 (1939); Scripps v. Sweeney, 160 Mich.
148, 125 N.W. 72 (1910); Funkhouser v. Capps, 174 S.W. 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
15Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (Ch. 1953).
1Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
17Bator v. United Sausage Co., 138 Conn. 18, 81 A.2d 442 (1951). Differing
results in cases of this type involving similar facts may often be explained by the
difference in the business corporation acts of different states. For this reason, a
comparative study of the cases alone is not very helpful.
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power to prevent any amendment to the charter or bylaws which
would interfere with that right. This latter includes the power to
prevent the issuance of additional shares in a manner which would
dilute a minority stockholder's voting position. Sufficient control at
the stockholder level to assure election to the board of directors might
be gained in many states, including Florida, by provisions for cumulative voting in the charter.' 8 It is not clear at the present time what
the status of general unanimity or high voting requirements at stockholders' meetings is in Florida, though they are apparently not
authorized for the election of directors.19 The Business Corporation
Act does not expressly cover the matter, and there are no significant
cases. It seems clear that high quorum requirements for stockholders'
meetings are permissible in Florida,20 but this is not as effective as
some device that will affirmatively assure each stockholder of being
elected to the board.21 Stockholders' agreements,

22

voting trusts, 23 and

(1957) authorizes provisions to be inserted in the
18FLA. STAT. §608.03 (2) (j)
articles relating to cumulative voting for directors.
19FLA. STAT. §608.08(1) (1957): "The directors of every corporation shall be
chosen . . . by a plurality of the votes cast at such election." (Emphasis added.)
It was because of such a provision in the New York Stock Corporation Law that
a unanimity provision for the election of directors was held invalid in Benintendi
v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., supra note 16. It may be very significant that this legislative
command is not modified by the familiar "unless the certificate of incorporation
provides otherwise." The situation is different when stockholder approval of
fundamental changes is involved, high voting requirments being expressly authorized: FLA. STAT. §608.18 (1) (1957) (charter amendment), §608.19 (1) (sale of assets),
§608.20 (2) (consolidation and merger), §608.27 (1) (voluntary dissolution). The Florida Business Corporation Act has no voting provisions relating to the adoption by
stockholders of bylaws or ordinary resolutions.
20FLA. STAT. §608.10(4) (1957): "A majority of the stock entitled to vote shall
constitute a quorum at any stockholders' meeting unless the certificate of incorporation or by-laws otherwise provide." A bylaw establishing a high quorum requirement for stockholder action was held void in Gentry-Futch Co. v. Gentry, 90
Fla. 595, 106 So. 473 (1925), but the applicable section of the Florida Business
Corporation Act at that time did not contain the last nine words just quoted.
FLA. REV. GEN. STAT. §4082 (1920).
21A high quorum requirement for holding a stockholders' meeting may enable
a minority stockholder to block the holding of a meeting, but this would be helpful to him only if he was already on the board of directors; the inability to hold
a meeting would mean that the old directors would hold over, since no successors
could be elected. See O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions: Use of Special Charter and By-Law Provisions, 18 LAW 9- CONTEMP. PROB.
451, 464 (1953).
22Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (Ch. 1953).
23FL. STAT. §608.43

(1957).
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class voting 24 have been used to establish some degree of minority
control at the stockholder level. In Florida, however, no device is
as completely clean, uncomplicated, and legally certain as cumulative
voting, which can enable each substantial stockholder to elect himself
to the board of directors even though he is a minority stockholder.2 5
Actually, such a stockholder will not care a great deal about a general
veto power which may permit him to keep some other stockholder
from being elected to the board as long as he has the veto power over
fundamental changes, which it is apparently possible to confer in
Florida.2
Another important and related matter is the power of stockholders to remove directors. If directors can be removed without
cause by the stockholders, this will be a consideration causing a
minority stockholder to insist on the unanimity or veto type of control in each stockholder as opposed to a cumulative voting right.
The conclusion is that there are several devices for providing some
type of minority control at the stockholder level if the diligent attorney wishes to find and utilize them. Much can be said, of course,
for statutes such as some states have enacted that expressly authorize
high voting requirements. 2 The Model Business Corporation Act
of the American Bar Association authorizes charter clauses requiring
28
a high vote for stockholder action.
If a dose corporation has a three-man board of directors and the
24Shares can be classified so that each stockholder is allocated all the shares of
a given class, each class being permitted to" elect a specified number of directors.
The Florida Business Corporation Act permits the classification of shares with
respect to, inter alia, voting powers. FLA. STAT. §608.14 (1) (1957).
251f cumulative voting of shares can be coupled with a high vote or unanimity
requirement for director action, this may give each stockholder a veto over action
within the province of the board of directors. O'Neal, Molding the Corporate
Form to ParticularBusiness Situations: Optional Charter Clauses, 10 VAND. L. REv.
1, 33 (1956). But see note 37 infra.
2
GSee note 19 supra.
27E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (4) (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, §157.146
(Smith-Hurd 1954); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §271.315 (7) (1955); MD. ANN. CODE art.
23, §42 (a) (1957); MicH. STAT. ANN. §21.32 (Supp. 1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. §351.270
(1952); Nan. REv. STAT. §21-137 (1954); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §9; N.C. Ga. STAT.
§55-66(b) (Supp. 1957); Omo Rxv. CODE ANN. §1701.52 (Page Supp. 1958); Tax.
Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 9.08 (1956); VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-33 (1950); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §30180) (1955). N.D., Kans., Ore., and Utah also have such statutes. See
O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations,23 LAW & CoNrraEMP. PROB.

341 (1958).
28ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRnP. AcT §136 (1953).
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minority stockholder who desires some control owns less than one
fourth of the shares plus one, 29 cumulative voting may not offer a
solution. Such a stockholder would not own enough stock to be assured of a seat on the board of directors even with cumulative voting.
This could be solved by providing for a larger board, but if there
are only two stockholders this would mean bringing in even more
dummy directors, which might make corporate action cumbersome
as well as raise the problem of controlling the dummies. The best
solution in this situation might be to have a three-man board of
directors and three classes of stock, the certificate of incorporation providing that each class elect one director. ° The stockholder with less
than a one-fourth interest could be issued all the shares of one class.
There are doubtless other ways to accomplish this with little risk
as to validity.
One other device, already mentioned, for creating some minority
stockholder control over the election of directors is a high voting
requirement for stockholder action. There could be a charter provision or bylaw requiring unanimity or a ninety per cent vote of the
outstanding shares in order to elect directors, which would give a
holder of twenty per cent of the shares veto power at the stockholder
level. There could then be no election of directors unless all such
stockholders agreed. Couple this with a bylaw providing that all
directors shall continue in office until their successors are elected.
Then, if all the stockholders are named to the initial board of
directors contained in the articles, 31 each stockholder will be assured
of a seat on the board. The danger of this solution is that the Florida
Business Corporation Act has a section covering the election of directors that is similar to a New York statute that resulted in this type
of arrangement being held invalid there.32
Pre-emptive rights are an important consideration in the close
corporationY3 If new shares can be issued without according pre290r a board of five, and the minority stockholder owns less than one sixth
of the shares plus one; or a board of seven, and the minority stockholder owns less
than one eighth of the shares plus one, etc.

3oSee note 24 supra.
31FLA. STAT. §608.03 (2) (h) (1957): "The articles of incorporation shall contain
• . . the names and post office addresses of the members of the first board of
directors, who, unless otherwise provided by the articles of incorporation or the
bylaws, shall hold office for the first year of existence of the corporation or until
their successors are elected or appointed and have qualified."
32See note 19 supra.
330'Neal, Molding the Corporate Form to Particular Business Situation: Op-
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emptive rights, it may be possible to change voting positions adversely
to some stockholder. This consideration is not peculiar to close
corporations; it is more important in such a context as a practical
matter, however, because there are more compelling reasons for
maintaining voting positions in the close corporation. Though the
certificate of incorporation may provide otherwise, the Florida Business Corporation Act has a provision for pre-emptive rights 3 4 that is

relatively weak.35 The astute attorney may be prompted to draft a
certificate provision for the close corporation providing stronger preemptive rights, though if a veto power to each stockholder and
director is successfully conferred, of course this alone will make it
possible for any stockholder who fears dilution of his voting position
to block any new issues of stock.
Minority stockholder veto power over fundamental changes is
quite common at the present time. This is because stockholder
participation in charter amendments, consolidations, mergers, and
voluntary dissolution is usually prescribed by statutory requirements
for a favorable vote, approval, or consent of stockholders. If the certificate of incorporation can provide for a high voting requirement, a
veto over such changes can be effectively conferred. Many business
corporation acts, including that of Florida, permit the certificate to
require greater than a majority vote of stockholders on proposals for
such organic changes. 36
Perhaps the simplest device for providing partner-like control
in a close corporation is to renounce completely the corporate way of
doing business by requiring unanimity, or voting requirements so
high as to approach unanimity, for action by stockholders and directors. The difficulty here is that the judicial attitude has not been
favorable toward attempts to modify the corporate norm of control
by majority action of a board of directors. 37 Courts have indicated
tional Charter Clauses, 10 VAND. L. Rv. 1, 41-42 (1956).
34FLA. STAT. §608.42 (2) (1957): "Unless otherwise provided by the certificate of
incorporation,every stockholder, upon the sale for cash of any new stock of the same
kind, class or series as that which he already holds, shall have the right to purchase his pro rata share thereof .... " (Emphasis added.)
35Trau, supra note 8, at 72-74. The word new in FLA. STAT. §608.42 (2) (1957)
apparently refers not only to newly authorized stock but also to previously authorized but newly issued stock, a strong position on a point much in dispute elsewhere. Rowland v. Times Publishing Co., 160 Fla. 465, 35 So.2d 399 (1948).
36See note 19 supra.
37E.g., Finn Bondholders, Inc. v. Dukes, 157 Fla. 642, 26 So.2d 802 (1946)
(semble); Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 AtI. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910);
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that such requirements are against public policy,38 so their validity
would be doubtful even in the absence of the common provision in
business corporation acts providing for the business of every corporation to be managed by a board of directors. Some modification of
the corporate norms will be tolerated but not complete renunciation.
There is no real reason, however, why stockholders in a closely held
corporation should not be allowed to control each other as partners
do in so far as internal decisions are concerned. No one is affected
except the stockholders; if they all agree to it, it should be of no
concern to the public or the state, but courts have said that stoLkholders cannot be partners inter sese and a corporation to the rest of
the world. 39 There is a tinge of logic and righteousness about such a
statement, but is there any substantial public interest involved? Why
cannot two stockholders be partners, in a sense, as between themselves
by agreement and a suitably implementing certificate of incorporation
and bylaws? If creditors, the general public, and the state are not
adversely affected, there is nothing about such an arrangement which
can be described as immoral, indecent, or against public policy.40
It might be argued that limited liability has been granted to
corporations to enable them to attract capital from the public and
that, since the participants in a close corporation do not desire to
attract capital from the public, it follows that there is no consideration
of public policy that favors permitting them to attain limited liability
by adopting the corporate form. The best answer to that argument
is that the mechanics of representative government in the corporation, which the close corporation stockholders wish to avoid, have
nothing to do with limited liability. Those persons outside the
corporation who might run some greater risk because of the presence
of limited liability are not protected by the observance of management
by majority rule in the corporation. Creditors are not protected bePark, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d
633 (1948); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945);
Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944). Contra, DeBoy v. Harris, 207
Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1954); Roland Park Shopping Center v. Hendler, 206 Md.
10, 109 A.2d 753 (1954); Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (Ch.
1953) (apparently rejecting for New Jersey the approach of what was long the
leading case on the point, Jackson v. Hooper, supra).
3SBenintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., supra note 37; Kaplan v. Block, supra
note 37.
3gJackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 598, 75 Atl. 568, 571 (Ch. 1910).
40Latty, The Close Corporation and the North Carolina Business Corporation
Act, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432 (1956).

Long
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cause the principle of majority rule has no creditor-protection significance. Creditor protection is afforded by provisions restricting
dividend declaration, capital impairment, and fraudulent transfers,
none of which would be affected by permitting close corporations to
dispense with majority rule at meetings of stockholders and directors.
The public is not affected, since, when it is dealing with the close
corporation, it is protected by doctrines of estoppel and apparent
authority, which are not controlled by these internal arrangements
among the stockholders.
There is no possible way in which the state could be affected by
permitting the union of limited liability and partnership characteristics in the dose corporation. The argument that the state has
an interest in the success of business enterprises cuts as convincingly
on one side as the other, for majority rule does not assure business
success any more than minority veto power. When such a close
corporation arrangement for minority veto control is held invalid, the
only effect is to replace the arrangements freely agreed upon by the
stockholders with a dictatorship of the majority stockholder or
stockholders. There are no convincing policy considerations that
justify imposing majority rule in a close corporation if a contractual
arrangement to the contrary has been entered into by the participants,
especially when majority rule can so easily degenerate into majority
dictatorship, which may mean the utter ruin of the minority participants who contracted specifically against such a development. Or, to express it another way, what is gained by the state or society in general
by insisting that, as the price for limited liability, incorporators must
subject themselves to the principle of majority rule even though such
control can culminate so disastrously for one or more of them when
41
the "honeymoon" period is over?
To illustrate, if Growl owns more than fifty per cent of the
shares and Gator is not permitted to stipulate for some form of
minority control, Gator can be completely excluded from the corporation except as a minority stockholder. With his livelihood depending upon his employment by the corporation, he cannot risk
putting it in the power of Growl to discharge him. If Gator has a
favorable bargaining position so that Growl will agree to some
type of minority control arrangement for Gator's protection, it is
difficult to discern anything wrong with their grafting it on the
411d. at 435; Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040, 1046 (1950).
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corporation. Some will argue that if the described situation exists,
then Gator and Growl ought to do business as a partnership. They
desire limited liability, however, and why should subjection to majority rule be the price of limited liability? There seems to be no
substantial, logical connection. It is like requiring by law that one
must join a country club in order to get married. Several states have
enacted legislation to legalize such high vote or high quorum arrangements. 42 The Model Business Corporation Act of the American
Bar Association authorizes high voting and high quorum arrangements at the director level.

43

High vote and high quorum requirements for meetings of stockholders and directors are not entirely effective if they can be modified
or abolished by a mere majority vote of directors and stockholders.

So if high voting and high quorum requirements are provided in
the certificate of incorporation, it should also contain similar high
44
voting requirements for any such amendments of the certificate.

Under the Florida Business Corporation Act a high quorum can
be established for stockholder's meetings, 45 but the directors must be
46

elected at such a meeting by a plurality of the votes cast.

The sec-

tion covering quorum requirements for directors' meetings is not
clear as to whether a high quorum can be required by the certificate
or bylaws; 47 and the section on voting at directors' meetings48 is very
42Note 27 supra deals with state business corporation acts that expressly authorize high voting arrangements for stockholder action. Some states have gone
even further and authorized high voting or other minority control arrangements
for action by boards of directors: e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, §157.37 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1958); MD.ANN. CODE art. 23, §56 (d) (1957); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAw §9; N.C.
GEN. STAT. §55-28(d) (Supp. 1957); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §1701.62 (Page Supp.
1958); Wis. STAT. ANN. §180.35 (1957).
43ABA-ALI MODEL. Bus. CORP. AcT §37 (1953).
44While a high stockholder vote may be required by the certificate for amendment of a certificate of incorporation of a Florida corporation, FLA. STAT. §608.18 (1)
(1957), there is no similar provision authorizing a high vote requirement applicable
to director action proposing an amendment of the certificate.
45FLA. STAT. §608.10 (4) (1957).
461d. §608.08 (1).
471d. §608.09 (1): "Unless the certificate of incorporation or by-laws provide
otherwise, the presence of a majority of all the directors shall be necessary at any
meeting to constitute a quorum to transact business .... ." Could this be subject
to the construction that the certificate or bylaws may provide that less than a majority of directors may constitute a quorum, but not that more than a majority
shall be necessary?
48FLA. STAT. §608.09 (1) (1957): "The act of a majority of directors present at
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similar to statutes which have been construed to prohibit high voting
or unanimity requirements in other states.49 It is quite possible that
a result similar to that of Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel- would be
reached under the Florida Business Corporation Act. Some amendments to that act are needed to remove legal doubts which hover
over close corporations that have minority participants protected from
arbitrary majority rule by high vote charter clauses or similar arrangements.
It is difficult to find any convincing reason why legally competent
persons should not be able to adapt the corporate business form provided in general business corporation acts to the structure that they
want and need, as long as they do not endanger other stockholders,
creditors, or the public. Since courts are reluctant to admit that incorporated partners can arrange such matters between them, the best
solution seems to be legislation to legitimate this bastard of the business world. As stated previously, several states already have such
legislation.51
a meeting where a quorum is present shall be the act of the board of directors ...
49See note 37 supra. An old Florida case contains a dictum indicating that a
bylaw requiring a vote of two thirds of the directors to remove an officer was valid
and enforceable. Stockton v. Harmon, 32 Fla. 312, 13 So. 833 (1893).
50294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945). This case concerned a two-man corporation. B owned less stock than D. In order to give B a check on majority stockholder D, bylaws were adopted that required unanimity for (1) all stockholders'
resolutions, (2) election of directors, and (3) all directors' action. Unanimity for
stockholders' resolutions was held to violate the statutory scheme of corporate
management provided by the New York Stock Corporation Law. Unanimity for
election of directors was held to violate a section (in almost the same words as
FA. STAT. §608.08 (l) (1957) of the New York General Corporation Law which
provided that directors be chosen "by a plurality of the votes at such election."
The bylaw requiring unanimity for action by directors was stated to be "utterly
inconsistent" with the common law rule and thus unenforceable, despite the fact
that the applicable section of the New York General Corporation Law providing
for majority rule at meetings of directors contained a typical "except when otherwise expressly required by law or the by-laws" clause. Florida's parallel, FLA. STAT.
§608.09(1) (1957), contains no such "unless otherwise provided" clause. Thus the
provision of the Florida act governing action by directors seems to call more
peremptorily for the Benintendi treatment of such a bylaw or charter. provision
than did the New York act at the time the Benintendi case was decided. On the
other hand, the broadly worded authorization of optional charter clauses found
in id. §603.03 (j) might support such a charter provision, and id. §608-13 (5) might
do the same for such a bylaw. O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations, 23 LAw & CoNrrEmp. PROB. 341, 344-45 (1958).
5'See notes 27, 42 supra.
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A provision in the Business Corporation Act such as the following
might help to create a favorable judicial attitude: 52
Except in cases where the shares of the corporation are
at the time or subsequently become generally traded in the
markets maintained by securities dealers or brokers, no written
agreement to which all of the shareholders have actually assented, whether embodied in the charter or bylaws or in any
side agreement in writing and signed by all the parties thereto,
and which relates to any phase of the affairs of the corporation,
whether to the management of its business or division of its
profits or otherwise, shall be invalid as between the parties
thereto, on the ground that it is an attempt by the parties
thereto to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or
to arrange their relationships in a manner that would be
appropriate only between partners. A transferee of shares
covered by such agreement who acquires them with knowledge thereof is bound by its provisions.
This is designed to provide business and the bar with a legal
framework in which partnership arrangements having any reasonable
business purpose can be fashioned within the corporate form with
a substantial assurance of validity.5 3 It will be noted that the sug-

gested section does not define the term close corporation but that the
absence of general trading in its shares in the securities markets is the
test of applicability. The shares of the close corporation are not
often the subject of general trading. If they are, it will not long be a
close corporation by any recognized definition of the concept. As a
matter of fact, transfer restrictions usually make general trading in
such shares impossible.
The draftsman can provide for transfer restrictions when he is
drawing up the incorporation papers for a close corporation, thereby
insuring the application of the suggested language. It is significant
that the "generally traded" test would have given no trouble in most
52See N.C.
53"Many

GEN. STAT. §55-73 (b) (Supp. 1957).
of the successful attacks on control arrangements departing from the

orthodox pattern of corporation management have been based on the argument
that such arrangements violate the statutory norm conferring on the board of
directors power to manage corporate affairs. The North Carolina statute precludes
that ground of attack." O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations,23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 341, 350 (1958).
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of the cases involving the validity of partner-like arrangements within
54
close corporations.
In order to make it even clearer that the public policy of Florida
is not hostile to close corporations of the type desired by Gator and
Growl, section 608.09 (1) of Florida Statutes 1957 should be amended
so that the first sentence will read as follows: "Subject to the provisions of the certificate, the by-laws, or an agreement between the
stockholders otherwise lawful, the business of every corporation shall
be managed and its corporate powers exercised by a board of not
less than three directors." 55 This would help eradicate the idea that
there is a sphere of jurisdiction for directors into which stockholders
cannot venture even though they are the owners and unanimous in
their desire to limit the power of the board of directors.
In order to remove any lingering doubts, it would be well to
amend section 608.9 (1) with respect to action of directors so that
"the act of a majority of directors present at a meeting where a
quorum is present shall be the act of the board of directors, unless
56
the act of a greater number is required by the charter or the by-laws."
Also, in regard to stockholders' action, section 608.10 should be
amended to make it clear that the certificate or bylaws may require
the concurrence of a greater proportion of the votes than a simple
majority of the shares represented at a meeting. Similarly, though not
as critically needed, quorum requirements for meetings of directors
could more dearly permit the charter or bylaws to require a "greater
number than a majority."
It might be argued that veto power or some other form of control
in a minority of stockholders is subject to abuse, but the answer is
that the voting powers of the majority can also be abused in a close
corporation, especially if the owners have unanimously agreed to
dispense with orthodox majority control. The promised protection
of such an agreement may have lured some of the minority stockholders into the enterprise. In a typical close corporation, in which
each participant except a majority stockholder needs such protection,
it seems that it should be made legally available if there is no majority share interest that is opposed. If a majority interest is opposed,
there will be no question of the legality of such an arrangement, for
there will never be one. Indeed, unanimous agreement of the par54Latty, The Close Corporation and the North Carolina Business Corporation
Act, 34 N.C.L. RPv.432 (1956).
55The suggested new language is in italics.
56The suggested new language is in italics.
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ticipants should be required for the imposition of such a departure
from the normal corporate pattern.
Nearly three quarters of the states have a statutory declaration
like that of Florida,5 providing that the business of every corporation
shall be managed by a board of directors. In contrast to early decisions
that held almost any type of stockholders' arrangement seeking to
modify management by the board of directors to be void, either because in conflict with a statutory norm or because inconsistent with
the general plan for corporate management provided by the legislature, recent cases disclose a tendency to permit some infringement
upon the principle of management by a centralized board even in
8
the absence of legislative change.5

For the minority stockholder who is concerned about his employment by the corporation, a long-term employment contract with the
corporation may not suffice because the power of removal may be
available in spite of the contract, damages for the breach of which
would hardly be adequate in view of the application of the doctrine
of avoidable consequences to employment contracts. Also, some decisions have held long-term contracts to usurp the functions of the
board of directors. It follows that he needs a general veto power on
the board of directors, so that the corporation cannot intentionally
breach by discharging him. The agreement among all the participants that Gator is to be the president or general manager will
then mean something5 9 Some states permit election of officers by
the stockholders, and this might be a solution to the problem of
tenure of the minority stockholder as an officer without infringing on
the area of discretion reserved for directors. The Florida act, however, provides for officers to be elected by the board of directors,O
and this eliminates such a possibility here in the absence of an
amendment to the act.
Should there be legislation to remove the uncertainties which
affect the legal status of the close corporation, some limitation in
order to keep the stockholders of a publicly-held corporation from
using such a device might be considered. It is not believed that use
by such a corporation is very likely, however, because of the difficulty
of obtaining underwriting for stock issues when such partnership§608.09 (1) (1957).
58See Hornstein, judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAw
57FLA. STAT.

& CONTEMP. PROB. 435, 443 (1953).
9

5 See The Business Lawyer, Nov. 1954, pp. 34-35.
60FLA. STAT. §608.40 (1957).
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type arrangements have been made. Yet the gradual evolution from
proprietorship to partnership to dose corporation to publidy-held
corporation will reach a point where the partner-like control arrangement and the need for public financing cannot be reconciled.
Stock cannot be marketed or generally traded if subject to all sorts of
side agreements, bylaws, and charter provisions, varying the usual
corporate pattern. This would destroy the ease with which such
shares are now traded. The publicly financed corporation cannot
wear dose corporation garb with any more aplomb than the close
corporation that tries to fit into the publicly-held corporation uniform.
There is no place for Procrusteanism here.
One of the best arguments for permitting close corporations to
have minority control arrangement is that the same objective can be
attained by using other devices. For example, the principle of majority control by those contributing the most capital can be nullified
by giving voting shares to some stockholders and nonvoting shares to
others,6 or by use of multiple voting shares allocated to achieve
the same purpose. 62 It can also be done with a voting trust. 63 What

kind of magic is there in these particular devices? It might even be
legally possible to form an orthodox partnership and then have the
partnership acquire all the stock of the corporation. With the partnership controlling the corporation, the unwanted corporate norms could
be jettisoned.6 4 If these devices are available, why not instead let
the partners incorporate and then graft their partnership arrangement upon the corporation? To forthrightly provide for this halfway house in the statutes would be less devious and not give such an
advantage to the cunning and the clever.
STocK TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS

Another major purpose of stockholders in a dose corporation is
to remain dosed; they desire to have some control over the selection
of new associates on the death or withdrawal of the present stockholder-participants. This purpose may spring from their desire to
protect themselves against having to* deal with uncongenial, untalented, or downright hostile "partners." It may arise because of
61ld. §608.14 (1).
21bid.; id. §608.10 (3).
63Id. §608.48.
64La Varre v. Hall, 42 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1930); DeBoy v. Harris, 207 Md. 212,
113 A.2d 903 (1955).
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the danger of predatory competitors buying into the corporation. The
stockholder-officers of the close corporation are as much concerned
with the identity of their associates as are partners and hence are
likely to make arrangements to restrict shareholdings to acceptable
persons. While some of the old cases held that all restrictions on
transfer of shares were illegal restraints on alienation, the present
weight of authority favors permitting reasonable restrictions, especially if they are provided for in the certificate of incorporation. 65
There are three basic types of stock transfer restrictions: (1) the
purchase option in favor of the corporation, which is the most widely
used type of restriction; (2) a consent restraint, in which the stockholder must obtain the consent of someone before he can dispose of
his stock; and (3) the buy-and-sell agreement, in which the surviving
stockholders agree to buy the stock of a stockholder when he dies.
A number of courts, however tolerant they must be of a first
refusal type of restriction, will not recognize a consent type on the
ground that this puts the transfer of one man's property at the mercy
of another man's veto, which may be exercised arbitrarily. 6r There
is a sharp division among the courts over the validity of this second
type of transfer restriction, which requires directors or stockholders
to approve before shares can be transferred.6 7 As a practical matter,
a first refusal restraint on the sale by a stockholder and a right to
purchase in case of transfer by operation of law may be all that the
incorporated partners really need. This type of stock transfer restriction has been held valid in Florida. 68 The Florida Supreme Court
relied on two sections of the Business Corporation Act, one of them
having been changed somewhat since that case. 69 The other section,
65E.g., Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atd. 723 (Sup.
Ct. 1930); Weissman v. Lincoln Corp., 76 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1954); Allen v. Biltmore
Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812 (1957); see Annot., 2 AL.R.2d 745
(1948); Note, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 54 (1957). The older judicial attitude probably
survives in the rule of strict construction applied to restrictions on transfer of
shares even in the most recent cases.
66BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 778 (1946); Latty, supra note 40, at 450-51.

67A consent restraint type of transfer restriction was present in Weissman v.
Lincoln Corp., supra note 65, but it was not in issue and its validity was not determined. Note, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 54, 59 (1957).
6sWeissman v. Lincoln Corp., supra note 65, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 321 (1955).
69FA. STAT. §610.03 (6) (1951) provided that "every corporation ... shall have
power to .. . make . .. by-laws . . .for ...the transfer of its stock ...." FLA.
STAT. §608.13 (5) (1957), which succeeds this section, reads substantially the same
except that the last phrase is "the transfer on its records of its stock .... ." (Em-
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remaining unchanged, is 608.03 (2) () of Florida Statutes 1957.70
There are no statutory provisions relating to transfer restrictions
on stock in close corporations as distinguished from business corporations generally. 71 Cases indicate that transfer restrictions contained
72
in the certificate are a better risk than those contained in the bylaws.
It may be argued that this is because of the lack of notice of the bylaws as distinguished from the constructive notice of the certificate,
but this is not convincing in view of the fact that purchasers without
notice of the restriction can rely on the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
provision73 requiring the restriction to be stated on the share certificate in order to be effective.74 The careful lawyer will put transfer
restrictions in the certificate, and perhaps in the bylaws and agreement as well.
The first refusal type of transfer restrictions should be made in
favor of the corporation first and the stockholders next.7 5
way, a possible difficulty might be avoided in a situation in

In

this

which

phasis added.) The amendment came in 1953. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28170, §.
Note, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 54, 56-57 (1957).
70"The articles of incorporation shall contain:

See

"(j) Any provision which the incorporators may choose to insert for the regulation of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation and any
provision creating, dividing, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation,
the directors and the stockholders or any class of the stockholders, including, but
not limited to, provision for cumulative voting for directors, a list of officers, and
provisions governing the issuance of stock certificates to replace lost or destroyed
certificates."
To banish any lingering doubt regarding the status of such a restriction in
the certificate of a Florida corporation, it might be well to add to FLA. STAT.
§608.03 (2) a clause to the effect that the charter may include "any provision
relating to the transfer of the shares of the corporation and restrictions thereon."
7lAt least one state, however, has attempted to regulate by statute stock transfer restrictions in general. TEx. Bus. CoRP. Acr art. 2.22 (Supp. 1958).
72See Hornstein, judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership,18 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 435, 447 (1953).
73§15.
74FLA. STAT. §614.17 (1957).

The fact that restrictions on the transfer of shares
are covered by this section is implied recognition of their validity, provided there
is compliance with this section. The specific reference to transfer restrictions, "by
virtue of any by-laws of such corporation, or otherwise" (emphasis added), is some
indication that they may be contained in the bylaws of Florida corporations.
750'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting, 65 HARv. L. Ray. 773, 794-95 (1952); Note, 10 U. FLA. L.
REv. 54, 65-66 (1957).
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the corporation either cannot purchase legally or does not have the
resources to do so, and yet the remaining stockholders do not wish
the stock involved to get into the hands of outsiders and are financially
able to purchase it themselves.76
The courts will not enlarge transfer restrictions by implication,
and so it is very important that the restriction clearly specify whether
it applies to voluntary inter vivos transfers of the shares only, or also
to gifts, testamentary dispositions, intestate succession, or other transfers by operation of law. Similarly, it should cover the matter of
whether a transfer to existing stockholders or members of a stockholder's immediate family is within the restrictions.77
A serious problem in connection with transfer restrictions is that
of arriving at the price at which the affected stock is to be sold.
A method that has come into frequent use in recent years involves
appraisal and arbitration. Such a transfer restriction specifies the
manner in which the appraisers or arbitrators are to be selected and
usually provides that if the arbitrators can agree on a price, that price
shall be conclusive.78
The book value standard of evaluation is sometimes used instead
of appraisal by arbitrators, though book value often has little relationship to the actual value of the shares. Since asset value is
subject to some manipulation by the board of directors, it is possible
that book value might be a poor test because the withdrawing stockholder might find book value maneuvered against his interest 59
In the absence of any express statutory prohibition or a restriction
against such purchases in the certificate or bylaws, it is generally
held that every corporation has the power in good faith to purchase
its own stock if there is surplus sufficient to cover the purchase. The
power to make such purchases if surplus is available is expressly con76it might be well to provide that stockholders' rights to purchase are in proportion to their respective holdings. As a matter of fact, the first option type of
restriction on transferability can be viewed as a sort of glorified pre-emptive right,
with the corporation or its stockholders having the right to participate, not only
in new issues but in any change in ownership of shares.

?7 Trau, Florida's Corporate Code: Draftsmanship and Practice, 12 U. MIA1,1I L.
REv. 63, 69-72 (1957).
78Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely-Held Corporation, 59
YALE L.J. 1040, 1049-51 (1950); Trau, supra note 77, at 71.
79At best, book value is based on the historical accounting valuation of assets
and thus usually ignores the going value of the business, good will, and appreciation in the value of assets.
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ferred on Florida corporations.80 The act should make it clear, however, that a corporation can exercise its rights to purchase shares
pursuant to restrictions on transfer thereof even though there is no
surplus to cover the purchase. Otherwise, a purchase the corporation
desired to make might be prohibited and the transfer restriction nullified.81
Some time limit should be set in a first refusal type of transfer restriction within which the option must be exercised. This is often
thirty days. After the expiration of this period the selling stockholder
is free to sell his shares to whomever he pleases.
Courts tend to sustain a transfer restraint imposed when the
corporation is first organized. The explanation is that the agreement
to restrict transferability is part of the conditions under which the
corporation was formed and the shares issued, and that free transferability was limited before the shares came into existence. This
being true, it may be sound planning and drafting to have the restrictions stated in the preincorporation agreement as well as in the
certificate.
In contrast to the first two types of transfer restrictions is the
third type of restriction -the buy-and-sell agreement. Some sort of
arrangement should be available in many close corporations whereby
a withdrawing stockholder will have the right to have his shares
purchased by someone. A mere restriction on sale does not necessarily imply an obligation on anyone to purchase. Since the shares
in a dose corporation are not easy to sell in many instances, it is
often important that the withdrawing stockholder have assurance
that he can get his interest out intact. As a practical matter, the remaining stockholders are usually the only prospective purchasers of
stock in a closely held corporation. Unless protected by such an arrangement compelling the others in the corporation to purchase at
a fair price, the withdrawing stockholder may have to sell for whatever is offered. The bid may be only a small fraction of what the
stock is really worth. So the transfer restriction may go further and
create a duty, rather than a mere option, for the corporation or remaining stockholders to purchase the shares of those withdrawing or
dying.
As with the transfer restriction, some formula must be included
80FLA. STAT. §608.13 (9) (b) (1957).
SiSince to carry out such a purchase would amount to an illegal withdrawal of
capital, partidpating directors might be liable under FLA. STAT. §608.54 (1957).
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for determining the selling price. It is certainly easier to reach an
agreement about the formula or price in advance than it is when
buyer and seller bicker with keen interest in the result. Again, appraisal and arbitration or book value may be used to arrive at a
price.
Since there is usually no readily available market for shares in a
close corporation, it is very important that any agreement to purchase be specifically enforceable. Specific performance is often the
only adequate remedy for the withdrawing stockholder or his survivors.

82

Some provisions may also be included as to whether payment is
to be in cash or over a period of years. To make sure the cash is
available when wanted, life insurance policies are frequently purchased. In the event of default on the part of the corporation or the
stockholders in executing a purchase agreement, the draftsman might
consider providing for compulsory dissolution and liquidation. 3
While it is not clear that Florida courts will recognize just any
type of transfer restriction, it is very clear, even without a statutory
change, that the popular first refusal type of transfer restriction is
recognized. Presumably, this could be made in favor of the corporation, or the other stockholders, or both, in whatever sequence might
be agreed upon. In view of Weissman v. Lincoln Corporation,14
lawyers should include such restrictions in the certificate of incorporation of Florida corporations and, in view of section 614.17 of
Florida Statutes 1957, on the stock certificate. As to this latter, however, the Weissman case held that the restriction does not have to be
published verbatim on the share certificate; notice of the restriction
and incorporation of it by reference to the minutes of the corporation
sufficed in that case.8 5 There is no reason to experiment with transfer
82Trau, supra note 77, at 72.
83Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 VA. L.
REV. 229 (1951).
8476 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1954). The restriction held valid in this case was actually
contained in a stockholders' agreement, but the transferee had notice of the restriction prior to his purchase of the shares. Also, the certificate and bylaws provided that the stockholders could impose transfer restrictions on shares by agreement. The opinion by Sebring, J., was careful to note that the case did not deal
with a restriction "contained in a by-law standing alone." Id. at 481. A first
option contained only in an agreement was specifically enforced in favor of the
optionee in Greenwood v. Rotfort, 158 Fla. 197, 28 So.2d 825 (1946).
8576 So.2d 478, 483-84. Not all courts have been so easily satisfied. Citizens'
Bank v. Bank of Penfield, 24 Ga. App. 435, 101 S.E. 203 (1919); Chandler v. Blanke
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restrictions in bylaws or agreements alone when some doubt exists as
to their effectiveness, though there may be good reason to include
them in all three: certificate, bylaws, and shareholders' agreement. 8
It is fair to conclude that stock transfer restrictions do not breed
such uncertainties, either in Florida or elsewhere, as do minority
control arrangements. The judicial attitude toward stock transfer
restrictions is in marked contrast to the judicial attitude toward arrangements for minority control. In spite of the policy in favor of
free transferability, the courts are increasingly holding reasonable
restrictions to be valid, although this norm of free transferability
causes any restriction to be strictly construed in favor of transferability.
PROVISIONS FOR DISSOLUTION AND ARBITRATION:
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST DEADLOCK

A very real crisis may develop when there is a serious disagreement
among the participants in a dose corporation. There is a simple
solution in a partnership. When an impasse arises, a partner can
usually bring about a judicial dissolution even though the partnership
term has not expired.7 If the courts will not decree dissolution of
the partnership, a partner may breach the partnership agreement
and dissolve if he is willing to run the risk of paying damages for
his breach. It is clear that in a partnership even a junior partner has
the power to break a deadlock by dissolution. The dose corporation
is particularly susceptible to deadlock because of the minority control
arrangements, which may give a minority interest disproportionate
voting power or even a veto power. It would be unwise to give such
control to minority participants in a close corporation through statutory or judicial tolerance of high vote and high quorum requirements
and other partner-like characteristics and yet, despite the increased
danger of deadlocks, to provide no remedy for the cases of corporate
paralysis thereby arising.
The difficulty surrounding deadlocks is one of the principal reasons given by the courts for invalidating minority control arrangements.88 Probably implicit in such decisions are the objectives of
Tea & Coffee Co., 183 Mo. App. 91, 165 S.W. 819 (1914).
S6Note, 10 U. FLA. L. Rv. 54, 62-64 (1957).
87UNIFORM PARTNERSnIP Acr §32 (1) (d) (f).
8sKaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944). The giving of veto
powers to stockholders increases the chance of deadlocks and creates a need for
a speedy means of resolving differences or for a satisfactory method of dissolving
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protecting creditors and employees by insuring the continuance of
the business and preventing some stockholders from exploiting others
at dissolution sales. Yet the continuance of a corporation whose stockholders are willing to ruin it rather than agree is not a satisfactory
solution either. Arbitration and sale of shares by one stockholder
either to the other or to an outsider may not be possible; dissolution
may be the best available solution. This is another area in which
state business corporation acts drafted for the publicly held corporation have generally overlooked the problem of the close corporation.
There are several possibilities. First, the minority participant may,
pursuant to the close corporation arrangement embodied in the
certificate, bylaws, and side agreement, hold a guaranteed position
in the corporation with a stipulated salary. Even so, he will probably
have to go to court to enforce his rights, and the judicial attitude
towards such close corporation arrangements has not always been
helpful. At any rate, litigation is expensive. Second, a minority participant may try to sell his stock. This theoretical possibility is often
a practical illusion. Minority stock in a close corporation has an uncertain market value, and sometimes none at all. Not only this, but
the sale of stock may be restricted in such a manner as to give the
corporation or the majority stock interest a first option to purchase
at a favorable price. This leaves two remaining possible remedies:
dissolution and arbitration.
In the publicly held corporation, friction cannot lead to deadlock.
If a particular director makes trouble for the stockholders in control,
he is simply not re-elected when his term expires. It is for this reason
that most corporation acts in their dissolution provisions go no further
than to set forth a procedure for voluntary dissolution, usually by the
board of directors recommending dissolution followed by a favorable
vote of stockholders. Both director and stockholder action will usually
be by majority vote. 9 If minority control devices are in existence,
this type of dissolution can be blocked by the minority, thus intensifying the deadlock. There are also involuntary dissolution provisions,
of course, but these normally have no bearing on the problem of
stalemate and deadlock. 9°
the enterprise when corporate paralysis ensues. Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 778 (1952).
89FLA. STAT. §608.27 (1) (1957). More than a majority vote of stockholders in
favor of voluntary dissolution may be required by the certificate of incorporation
or bylaws.
90F A. STAT. §608.36 (1957). This section provides for involuntary dissolution
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A court faced with a close corporation afflicted with a deadlock
that would justify a partnership dissolution will usually hold that it
lacks power to decree a dissolution except on statutory grounds.91
There is authority to the contrary.9 2 Florida has devised the unique
remedy of decreeing the sale of the property of a close corporation
paralyzed by deadlock and ordering the proceeds distributed among
the stockholders according to interest, disregarding the corporate
entity and the question of dissolution.93 This solution has its appealing practical side, but something more certain than this discretionary
dispensation by a court of equity may be desired by the business
community. State business corporation acts have begun to include
deadlock as one of the grounds for compulsory dissolution at the
instance of less than a majority interest. 94 There is much variation in
the language used in these statutes, but several of them clearly
authorize dissolution when deadlock is brought about through the
operation of minority control arrangements.
as a penalty for failure to file the annual report required by id. §608.32 and for
failure to pay the capital stock tax required by id. §608.33. The secretary of state
initiates this type of dissolution, with the governor proclaiming the dissolution.
OlCentral Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 I1. 2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957);
see Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1260 (1950); Latty, The Close Corporation and the New
North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. Rv. 432, 448 (1956). Such
seems to be the Florida position: Jones v. Harvey, 82 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1955); Freedman v. Fox, 67 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1953); Hanes v. Watkins, 63 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1953);
Finn Bondholders, Inc. v. Dukes, 157 Fla. 642, 26 So.2d 802 (1946) (semble); NewsJournal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So.2d 741 (1941). See also Strong v. Broward
County Kennel Club, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Fla. 1946); In re Hollywood Bond
& Mortgage Co., 51 F.2d 255 (S.D. Fla. 1931). An exception is recognized when
the corporation has practically discontinued all of its business, or is no longer
capable of being made to carry out the corporate functions for which it was
chartered. Mills Dev. Corp. v. Shipp & Head, Inc., 126 Fla. 490, 171 So. 533 (1937);
Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Wood, 97 Fla. 493, 121 So. 789 (1929); Knight & Wal
Co. v. Tampa Sand Lime Brick Co., 55 Fla. 728, 46 So. 285 (1908).
02Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pulliam, 200 Okla. 185, 191 P.2d 975 (1948); BALLANTINE, CORPORATION S 715 (1946); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 956-58 (1949); Hornstein,
Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L.J. 1040, 1046
(1950); Note, 36 TExAs L. Rv. 660 (1958).
93Kay v. Key West Dev. Co., 72 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1954); Wofford v. Wofford, 129
Fla. 445, 176 So. 499 (1937).
94E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §4651 (b)- (d) (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 32, §157.86 (a)
(Smith-Hurd 1954); IND. ANN. STAT. §25-242(6) (1948); MINN. STAT. §301A9 (4)
(1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. §351.485, 1 (1) (a) (1952); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAw §103; N.C.
GEN. STAT. §55-125 (a) (1) (2) (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §2852-1107 (A) (4)
(1958); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.771 (1) (a) (1957); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Aar
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Florida has a provision in its Business Corporation Act making
compulsory dissolution available in deadlock situations when opposing ownership interests are evenly divided. 5 Construed according to
its plain meaning, this statutory language would seem to cover only
the situation of a corporation deadlocked by an even split in stock
ownership and an evenly divided board of directors. This does not
cover the type of deadlock caused by minority control arrangements. It
is doubtful, therefore, that it would be effective to break a deadlock
96
other than in the narrow situation expressly described therein.
What is needed is a provision that would give a court power to
order dissolution and liquidation in an action brought by a stockholder when a deadlock among directors cannot be broken by vote
of the stockholders. This may be the case not only in an evenly divided situation but also when deadlock is caused by high vote or
unanimity arrangements embodied in the certificate or bylaws of a
§90 (a) (1) (1953).
5

§608.28 (1957): "When the total stock voting power is evenly divided into two independent ownerships or interests, and the number of directors
is even and equally divided respecting the management of the corporation with onehalf of the ownership favoring the course advocated by one-half of the directors,
and the other half of the ownership favoring the course of the other half, or
where the ownership is equally divided and the number of directors is uneven, but
the two halves of the ownership are unable to agree on or elect successor directors
and the old directors are holding over, the circuit court, sitting in chancery, may
entertain a petition from any stockholder for involuntary dissolution of the
corporation. If, after hearing thereon, the court finds that the division of ownership is equal and cannot be reconciled, he may appoint a receiver or trustee of
the corporation, and enter an order that it be dissolved."
96"Most of the deadlock statutory provisions clearly cover a situation in which
a board with an even number of members divides equally and the shareholders
cannot resolve the deadlock by election of a new board because the shares are
evenly divided between two shareholders or two factions. Some of the statutes,
however, apparently do not authorize the dissolution of a corporation which is
deadlocked because the charter or bylaws of the corporation require unanimity
or a high vote [for] director or shareholder action and no faction can get the
necessary vote; or, if they do authorize dissolution in such a situation, they do
not permit a shareholder with relative small holdings to bring the petition."
O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
341, 357 (1958). For other statutes limited substantially as that of Florida, see
MAss. ANN. LAWS C. 155, §50 (1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. §14:13-15 (Supp. 1958). It is
very significant that, in the absence of a broader statute, equitable relief for
deadlock of a close corporation is available from a Florida court "under its broad
equity powers without getting into the question of whether the corporate entity
itself may be dissolved by decree of the court." Kay v. Key West Dev. Co., 72 So.2d
786, 789 (Fla. 1954).
9 FLA. STAT.
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close corporation. Under such a provision the court should be given
the power to order dissolution and liquidation rather than required
to order it. Whether it exercises the power should be determined by
whether the situation calls for this extreme remedy. It is possible
that the inability of a majority stockholder to muster enough votes
to change the existing directorate may have been exactly what the
minority stockholder sought to effect by the minority control arrangement in the charter or bylaws. It should follow that deadlock in
electing new and different directors does not automatically call for
dissolution and liquidation. A finding of irreparable injury to the
corporation or its stockholders should be a requirement for such
dissolution. Such a limitation on this type of dissolution finds support in the deadlock dissolution provisions of other states.97
Another solution for the corporate deadlock problem is to provide statutory authorization for the participants to make their own
arrangement with respect to dissolution because of deadlock by providing in the certificate, bylaws, or agreement for those situations in
which a stockholder is entitled to dissolution. In the absence of an
authorizing statute there is doubt as to whether the courts would give
effect to such a dissolution arrangement even if all the stockholders
were parties to it.,, It should be possible for Gator and Growl to
work out an arrangement, if they so wish, by which a right to require
dissolution and liquidation would be conferred on each of them upon
the occurrence of certain events or conditions. For example, each participant could be given the right to require dissolution if he first offers
his shares to the other stockholder at a specified price and the latter
does not accept. Similarly, death or disability of a stockholder could
be an event upon the occurrence of which the other stockholder or
stockholders could obtain dissolution, but the most useful provision
would be one giving each stockholder the right to compulsory dissolution in the event of a deadlock among directors that stockholders
are not able to break. Such dissolution arrangements by agreement
97See note 94 supra. Dissolution of a deadlocked corporation under such a
statutory provision has been denied when it was operating profitably or the business was not seriously affected. In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d
563 (1954); Application of Cantelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Ist
Dep't 1949).
Oslsraels, supra note 88, at 792; Latty, The Close Corporation and the New
North Carolina Business CorporationAct, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432, 449 (1956); O'Neal,
Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 341,
354 (1958).
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have been upheld in a few cases, 99 but there is no reason why the
business corporation act of a state should not specifically authorize
them, dispelling all doubt. Some states now have such provisions.100
A refinement in dealing with corporate deadlock would be to
confer a statutory or contractual right upon the majority stockholder
or stockholders to buy out a complaining minority stockholder who
is seeking dissolution and liquidation. It would be necessary to
establish some method for appraisal of shares if this plan were made
a part of the Business Corporation Act. Some states have tried this. 101
The provision could specify that when a deadlock results from the
operation of minority control arrangements the majority stock interest will have an option to purchase the minority stockholder's shares
at a price determined by appraisal or in some fair manner.
Some may prefer a solution to corporate deadlock that preserves
the corporation as a going concern rather than one that calls for its
dissolution. Arbitration may offer such a solution. Not only does the
arbitration device preserve the corporate existence, but it is clearly
less expensive as a method for resolving paralyzing disputes among
the participants in a close corporation than either litigation or dissolution. Also, it is quicker and attended with less publicity. The
arbitration clause can be inserted in the preincorporation agreement
and in the certificate, with the exact procedure, including a method
10 2
for selecting the arbitrators, clearly specified.
The usual arbitration clause will, of course, cover many more matters than the deadlock problem with which this article is concerned,
but its possible utility in that connection is of great significance. Unfortunately, it is also shrouded in legal uncertainties. In the absence
of statute, an agreement to arbitrate future disputes is unenforceable,
revocable by a party thereto, and will not prevent a party from
resorting to the courts. 10 3 These common law rules were based on
the notion that an agreement to arbitrate future disputes had the
99Wolf v. Arant, 88 Ga. App. 568, 77 S.E.2d 116 (1953); Leventhal v. Atlantic
Finance Corp., 316 Mass. 194, 55 N.E.2d 20 (1944).
'OOE.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS

C.

156, §6 (h) (1948); N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§55-125 (a) (3)

(Supp. 1957).
10ICAL.

CORP. CODE
(1955).

§§4658-59

(1947); CONN.

GFN. STAT.

§5228 (1949);

NV.

VA.

CODE ANN. §3093
2022 O'NEAL,

CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§9.22-.23
(1958); O'Neal, Resolving Disputes in Closely Held Corporations: Intra-Institutional Arbitration, 67 HARV. L.

REv. 786, 819 (1956).

'o3Steinhardt v. Consolidated Grocery Co., 80 Fla. 531, 86 So. 431 (1920).
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The Florida
effect of depriving the courts of their jurisdiction.
arbitration statute was amended in 1957 to make it clear that written
agreements to arbitrate future disputes are enforceable and irrevocable.105
There has been expressed by some courts, however, a specific
judicial hostility to arbitration arrangements within the corporate
context on the ground that they are inconsistent with the corporate
norms provided by the business corporation act. 08 This type of objection may be encountered even in a state having an arbitration
statute. Even so, there are some decisions favorable to the use of
arbitration clauses to break deadlocks in close corporations."°" Others
are opposed on one ground or another."° 8 There seems to be a definite
feeling that the arbitration device will eventually be widely accepted
as an alternative to compulsory dissolution in cases of corporate
paralysis. 0 9 Objections have been raised to this prophecy on the
grounds that arbitration of disputes in close corporations requires
those who sought to keep the business away from outsiders to submit
a crucial question to the decision of a stranger, and, further, that the
assumption that those who are in a serious deadlock can be reconciled

1042 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §9.14 (1958); Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928); Simpson, Specific Enforcement
of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. PA. L. Rav. 160 (1934).
(1957): "Two or more parties may agree in writing to
-05FLA. STAT. §57.11
controversy existing between them at the time of the
any
submit to arbitration
agreement, or they may include in a written contract a provision for the settlement
by arbitration of any controversy thereafter arising between them relating to such
contract or the failure or refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof. Such
agreement or provision shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable without regard
to the justiciable character of the controversy; provided that this act shall not
apply to any such agreement or provision to arbitrate in which it is stipulated
that this law shall not apply or to any arbitration or award thereunder." Prior to
the 1957 change it was felt that the Florida arbitration statute (originally enacted
in 1828) did not apply to future disputes. See Yonge, Arbitration of an Ordinary Civil Claim in Florida, 6 U. FLA. L. REv. 157, 165 (1953).
1062 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPOR.ATONS §9.15 (1958).
1o7Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum 9- Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29 Del.
Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1946), modified, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct.
1947); Martocci v. Martocd, 42 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 266 App. Div.
840, 43 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1st Dep't 1943).
"0SApplication of Burkin, 1 N.Y.2d. 570, 136 N.E.2d 862 (1956), reversing I App.
Div. 2d 665, 147 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1st Dep't 1955) (holding that the particular controversy was not arbitrable); Roberts v. Whitson, 188 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
2O9The Business Lawyer, Nov. 1954, pp. 36-39.
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by arbitration so that they will become co-operative is questionable. 110
However this may be, the availability of the arbitration device for
breaking corporate deadlocks is clearer in Florida than in many states
because of the recent legislative changes.
RELAXATION OF CORPORATE FORMALITIES

A close corporation such as that of Gator and Growl is very
likely to conduct its business without observing those formalities of
corporate life which are thought by many to be essential to the corporate way of doing business. The stockholders and directors are
usually the same people, and it is quite common for them to fail to
differentiate between what they do as stockholders and what they do
as directors.2" Also, many close corporations do not keep bylaws or
minute books.
It is orthodox corporation law that neither stockholders nor directors can act except at duly called meetings.' 1 2 Nevertheless, the courts
often relax these traditional rules in order to sustain informal action
taken by stockholders or directors in a close corporation. Florida
has gone far in holding that decisions reached by all the stockholders
and directors in an informal conference, without a valid meeting of
either, bind the corporation and the participants." 3
Along with this liberal judicial attitude, state legislatures are
gradually relaxing the formal requirements for corporate meetings,
and some modern corporation acts permit stockholders and directors
to act informally by signing a written consent." 4 In order to clear
llOScott, The Close Corporation in Contemporary Business, 13 Bus. LAW. 741,
754 (1958).
"111 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §1.12 (1958).
112BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §170 (stockholders'

meetings), §44 (directors'
meetings) (1946).
"'3Patchen v. Robertson, 146 Fla. 138, 200 So. 400 (1941); Redstone v. Redstone
Lumber & Supply Co., 101 Fla. 226, 133 So. 882 (1931); Sommers v. Apalachicola
Northern R.R., 85 Fla. 9, 96 So. 151 (1922) (semble); South Florida Citrus Land
Co. v. Waldin, 61 Fla. 766, 55 So. 862 (1911); Etheredge v. Barrow, 102 So.2d 660
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). While the Redstone case seemed to depend on the doctrine
of ratification by acquiescence, the Etheredge case did not mention it. Also, both
cases indicated that failure of the board of directors to record their actions in the
minutes did not reflect on the validity of the acts. In both of these cases all the
stockholders and directors were present at the informal meetings.
"14E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §228 (1953) (shareholders only); MINN. STAT.
§§301.26(11), 301.28(7) (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§55-29, 55-63 (Supp. 1957);
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any lingering doubts concerning the validity of informal actions
taken by the directors of a close corporation, it might be well to enact
a new section of the Business Corporation Act that would treat as
board action the action taken by a majority of the directors even
without a formal meeting if either written consent to the action is
signed by all directors and filed in the minute book, or if all the
stockholders know of the action and make no prompt objection, or if
the directors have, to the knowledge of all the stockholders, been accustomed to taking action informally. A similar section could be
enacted to accord validity to stockholders' action without a meeting
or at an irregular meeting. Florida already has something going
much further than this in section 608.11 of Florida Statutes 1957,
which provides that, unless otherwise provided in the certificate or
bylaws,
"[W]hen stockholders who hold four-fifths of the voting stock
having the right and entitled to vote at any meeting shall be
present at such meeting, however called or notified, and shall
sign a written consent thereto on the record of the meeting, the
acts of such meeting shall be as valid as if legally called and
notified."
In connection with this section of the act, it might be well for the
draftsman to "otherwise provide" in the certificate of incorporation in
order to avoid the "freezing out" of some stockholder owning no more
than one fifth of the voting stock in a close corporation.
The argument may be made that these statutory provisions are
not needed because courts have been very understanding about departures from traditional formalities, particularly by dose corporations. Nevertheless, it is certain that no harm would come from such
provisions, and nothing in them should discourage a court from validating irregular corporate action under familiar doctrines of ratification by acquiscence or estoppel. The Attorney General of Florida
has recently rendered an opinion disapproving a charter provision
providing for informal action by agreement of all stockholders in
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2852-402(5) (1958); Wis. STAT. ANN. §180.91 (1957). Also
see ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRp. Acr §128 (1953), which permits stockholders to
act informally; Latty, The Close Corporationand the New North Carolina Business
CorporationAct, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432, 453-54 (1956); O'Neal, Recent Legislation Affecting Close Corporations, 23 LAw & CONTEMAP. PROB. 341 (1958).
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writing. 115 Presumably, since this opinion was in reply to a question
of the Secretary of State of Florida, charter provisions for informal
action by shareholders or directors that do not observe the statutory
formalities of chapter 608 will be disapproved if inserted in articles
of incorporation, thus blocking by administrative action efforts to
test them in the courts. Statutory sanction for such irregular action
by close corporations would remove the threat of litigation in an
area in which litigation has generally proved fruitless and would
clarify the matter for those charged with accepting corporate documents for official filing.
Also, it might be well to note that section 608.09 (2) of Florida
Statutes 1957 authorizes a board of directors to designate an executive
committee composed of two or more of their number that may exercise
the powers of the board of directors. This provision will permit considerable corporate business to be transacted without full, formal
board action even in a publicly held corporation. That the legislative
attitude toward legalizing informal action is favorable can be seen
in an amendment enacted in 1957 authorizing informal charter amendment - without meetings of directors or stockholders - when all directors and stockholders sign a written statement manifesting their
intention to amend the certificate. 116
CONCLUSION

What basis is there for denying the limited liability of the corporate form to "partners" who desire to enjoy that and other corporate
attributes but, for very practical reasons, cannot risk complete divestment of the partnership arrangement? It might be argued that if a
business does not currently need public financing the participants
should not be permitted to use the corporate form on the theory
that they should be forced to do business as a partnership, with the
attendant full personal liability, so that maximum protection for
creditors will be provided. It should be noted that this line of reasoning applies with equal cogency to the one-man corporation also.
This argument collapses when it is remembered that one-man
and close corporations are permitted, creditors notwithstanding, provided the formalities prescribed by law for the good corporate life
are observed. Yet it is clear that such protocol is not the equivalent
5

11 OPs. ATr'y GEN. FLA. 056-197 (1956).
116FLA. STAT. §608.18 (8) (1957).
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of personal liability of the participants, nor does it provide any appreciable protection for creditors dealing with such corporations.
The theory of corporation law is, rather, that the various limitations
on distributions, plus the public declarations contained in documents
on file in public offices, perform the function of protecting creditors;
but perhaps this whole theory needs rethinking.
The information on file in the typical secretary of state's office is
not the information that is helpful in determining whether to extend
credit to the corporation; and no one would expect a state securities
commission, created for the purpose of protecting purchasers of
corporate securities, to provide any helpful information for general
creditors."1 7 An item of information, for example, that might be most
helpful in determining whether to extend credit to a corporation
would be the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, but the
current ratio will be looked for in vain in public offices. The practical answer is, of course, that the corporation seeking credit supplies
the information direct to its prospective creditors when establishing
its credit. This being true, there would seem to be no justification
based on creditor-protection considerations for discriminating against
the participants in a close corporation, because they will have to
furnish their prospective creditors with similar information, the
data of real credit significance insisted upon by bankers and careful
businessmen. Generally speaking, neither the partnership nor the
corporation is required to file such information in a public office. If
corporations were required to file information of real credit significance, an even better case for legalizing the informal close corporation could be made, for the dose corporation as well as the publicly held corporation would each have to file such information for
the benefit of creditors, this proposed norm not being subject to
modification or relaxation by agreement among the participants.
There would then be no semblance of justification for insistence on
observance of the present so-called norms for creditor-protection purposes.
Creditors and credit information agencies are too realistic and
sophisticated to depend on the information they can find on file in
the typical secretary of state's office. Since the business world has
117There would be no occasion for a corporation to file financial information
with the typical state securities commission in the absence of a proposed issue of
securities. General creditors cannot, of course, wait for such a fortuitous development. See FLA. STAT. c. 517 (1957). It is believed that the same general statement
applies to the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Federal Government.
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discovered methods for evaluating the credit risk status of all corporations, why should there be concern over the absence of full personal liability of the participants in a close corporation and pressure
in the form of nonrecognition of partner-like arrangements to force
them to do business as a partnership? Most creditors are able to
look out for themselves. Most of them are too clever to extend credit
on the basis of public information that means nothing credit-wise; if
they make a practice of relying on such information they are not long
for the business world anyway. The intelligent and careful businessman who is going to survive has better sources of information [or
evaluating the credit risk of corporations with which he may wish to
do business; and it is safe to speculate that these sources supply information of a type that is not vastly different for proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations, close or otherwise. Forcing partners who
wish to incorporate to submit to majority rule and the formal mechanics of publicly held corporations will not contribute an iota to
the protection of creditors or to the progress and stability of the world
of business and should not be regarded as the quid pro quo for limited
liability.
The policy justification for according legal validity to close corporation arrangements wherein some partnership attributes are preserved has thus far been that of eliminating an irrational discrimination against the business organization with few participants, usually
a small business. Such discrimination results in a clog on business
development because it is the close corporation of today that will be
the future's publicly held giant. The development of our economy
has been encouraged by the doctrine of limited liability - the limitation of one's risk to his investment. If limited liability is available
only to big businesses, then relatively small businesses are threatened;
and the economy is threatened because the big corporation of tomorrow is a close corporation today. There is no justification for a
policy of corporate infanticide.
This would be reason enough for clarifying the legal status of
the close corporation if that were all, but it is not. One form of close
corporation is the joint venture corporation. It is coming into wide
use."" The joint venture corporation is merely the traditional joint
venture arrangement cast into a corporate form. Without incorporating, the joint venture has all the attributes of a partnership with
the participants being other corporations. In large operations of a
11sSee note 10 supra.
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highly speculative nature involving immense financial risk, such as
the exploration and production of oil in foreign countries, the need
for limitation of liability makes the corporate form particularly desirable. But, just as with other dose corporations, the participating
corporations seek to retain partnership attributes such as a voice in
ordinary management decisions and some control over the admission
of new participants to the joint venture. Such corporations are being
utilized in the oil, chemical, electronic, and atomic power industries." 9
They are being used for joint bidding on defense jobs when the undertaking is too large or too risky for any single participating corporation.120 The judicial attitude has been favorable,' 2' recognition being
given to the plain difference between such corporations and publicly
held corporations. The feeling has been that when no injury to outsiders such as creditors is involved, the rules of corporation law de:
signed primarily for the public issue incorporation should not be
applied just for the sake of consistency, particularly when this means
that arrangements agreed upon by the participants will be ignored
and unenforced. This same line of reasoning should apply with equal
force to all dose corporations.
Considerations such as these are bringing both courts and legislatures to a more sympathetic approach to the legal status of the close
corporation and its stockholders. Close corporation arrangements of
the type described herein are being permitted with an infinite variety
of variations to accommodate the needs of the particular business enterprise and its owners. 1 22 Representative of this changed attitude
are the many provisions contained in the Model Business Corporation
Act of the American Bar Association enabling close corporations to
adapt the orthodox corporate form to the particular needs of the
23
participants.1
The necessity for legal treatment of the close corporation dif119Broden and Scanlan, supra note 10; Hale, Joint Ventures: Collaborative
Subsidiaries and the Antitrust Laws, 42 VA. L. REv. 927 (1956).
12oThe Wall Street Journal, Aug. 18, 1958, p. 1, col. 6.
12'Wabash Ry. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir.
1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 643 (1926); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Atlantic C.L.R.R.,
240 N.C. 495, 82 S.E.2d 771 (1954). But cf. Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338

(Del. 1957).
l22Sturdy, The Significance of "Form" and "Purpose" in Determining the Effectiveness of Agreements Among Stockholders to Control Corporate Management, 13
Bus. LAw. 283 (1958).
123Campbell, The Model Business CorporationAct, The Business Lawyer, July
1956. pp. 98, 105-06.
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ferent from that accorded the publicly held corporation has long been
recognized in England. Special provision is made for "private"
companies having fifty or less stockholders. A great deal of flexibility
is permitted in such a corporation, its charter being essentially contractual in character and the statutory provisions applying only in
the event there is no contrary provision agreed upon by the incorporating stockholders. There is an absence of the statutory corporate
norms that have caused so much difficulty in this country in the
past when the bar has tried to meet the practical needs of the business
121
community.
There is a problem as to where the attorney should set forth the
contractual arrangement which protects the close corporation's participants from the undesired corporate norms. The maximum in
safety may be achieved by providing for the various partnership attributes in the preincorporation agreement among the participants,
in the articles of incorporation, and in the bylaws. This may seem
like "gilding the lily" to some, but there are reasons for such caution.
Some agreements have been held enforceable as contracts among
the participants although the parallel provisions in the articles were
held invalid. The arrangement should be set out in the articles because the preincorporation agreement may not bind the corporation,
and the validity of some aspects of the arrangement may depend on
the corporation being bound. For example, restrictions on the transfer of shares may depend for validity on their advancing some interest
of the corporation, and it is difficult to show such an interest if the
corporation is not a party to the arrangement. There is a very practical reason for including the particulars of the arrangement in the
bylaws; this keeps the deviations from the normal corporate pattern
more clearly before all concerned, particularly management. 12 5
It is very dangerous to use corporation forms generally found in
form books in drafting the articles and bylaws of a close corporation
that is expected to have partnership attributes. The same may be
said for using as models the papers drafted for the incorporation of
publicly held corporations.126 The danger is that provisions incon124Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1376-77 (1956); Mc Fadyean, The American Close Corporation
and Its British Equivalent, 14 Bus. LAW. 215 (1958); Scott, Developments in Corporate Laws, 12 Bus. LAW. 438-39 (1957).
1250'Neal, Molding the Corporate Form to ParticularBusiness Situations: Op.
tional Charter Clauses, 10 VAND. L. RaV. 1, 46-52 (1946).
1262 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS C. X (1958) contains suggested provisions for
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sistent with the desired partner-like arrangements will inadvertently
be inserted. The reason this may happen is that the usual corporation
forms are prepared with publicly held corporations in mind. A bylaw
inadvertently adopted may be held to have superseded a carefully
drawn preincorporation agreement containing provisions for the ar' ' 27
rangement desired by the incorporated "partners."
It is very important that the uncertainties still hanging over the
close corporation be dissipated. Legally, the dose corporation is the
most unsatisfactory stage in the evolution of the typical business unit.
It begins as a proprietorship. It grows and becomes a partnership as
more capital and more talent are needed. The partners then incorporate, largely to obtain limited liability and tax advantages. This is
the law's halfway house, the close corporation. As the partners retire
or die their shares go to relatives and outsiders, or else new capital is
needed to meet the need for expansion, so new issues of stock are
sold to the public. At this point the business has matured, and the
corporation is no longer "dosed." When the stage of the publicly
held corporation is reached, the partnership attributes retained during
the dose corporation stage are no longer useful and may be harmful.
Amendment of charter and bylaws is called for, and this may seem
difficult in view of the very minority control arrangement that the
corporation has outgrown. The difficulty may be a mirage, however,
because at this stage the stock is by hypothesis more widely held already and in hands of persons who no longer have any great interest
in retaining a minority control arrangement, particularly when it
stands in the way of increased earnings and dividends.. The stock of
a stubborn survivor of the dose corporation might be purchased. If
that fails, dissolution or arbitration may be used to effect the metamorphosis to full corporate maturity.
The healthy growth of American business is not facilitated by insisting that the transition from proprietorship or partnership to publicly held corporation be accomplished without legal provision for
the intermediate stage of development - the close corporation with
certain retained partnership characteristics. There is too much risk
and time involved in development of the needed legal principles
through the process*of courageous draftsmanship and expensive adjudication. Legislation'to clarify the legal status of the close corporation is in order.
close corporation documents.
127Kear v. Levinson, 71 Pa. D. & C. 475 (C.P. 1950).
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